Both Hitler and Churchill had a tendency to interfere in
the conflict in North Africa and they both regularly
insisted on offensive action to satisfy broader political
and strategic aims. Problems arose when these leaders
became obsessed with the need for offensive action whilst
not analysing the situation in North Africa itself.
Churchill grew increasingly impatient with his commanders
and Wavell and Auchinleck were casualties of this
impatience, when they refused to go on the offensive for
the simple reason that they would lose against a
numerically and technologically
superior enemy. “Churchill desperately needed
a victory, both for political and morale reasons2,
but these were no grounds to sacrifice the Eighth army
and even Montgomery received the same pressure when as
usual, Churchill pressed for an immediate resumption of
offensive operations, but Montgomery
refused to be rushed. After the Torch
landings in North Africa on the 8th November 1942, there
was confusion and disagreement as to who was in command
of the French forces and who was to be in overall
command. This slowed the progress of the landed troops ,
but cannot be said to have been decisive, but for Rommel`s
Afrika Korps Hitler's interference was just this. Hitler's
interest was fitful in any other theatre than the Russian
and until he was about to lose North Africa he treated it
as a sideshow, never grasping its place in the total
pattern of the war, as Churchill did even when Britain's
fortunes were at their lowest point, in 19403.
Rommel`s tactical withdrawal in late 1942 was constantly
hampered by Hitler's insistence on standing and fighting
the numerically superior Eighth Army, infact “Hitler
was so fully engaged with the worsening situation in
Russia that he was completely out of touch with the
situation in Tunisia4 When in late 1942
the ‘Desert Fox’ told Hitler that a delaying
attack upon the advancing Eighth Army would be futile and
counter-productive a signal came straight back...that
Rommel`s proposals were over-ruled5, which
was why Rommel then decided, probably against his better
judgment 6 to stand and fight the Eighth
Army. It should be stressed that the fact that Hitler was
so pre-occupied with the Eastern front led to the
misinformed orders that were to cost Rommel his armour, as well as his
last chance to regroup and conduct an organised and
effective counter-offensive against Montgomery
and his Eighth Army.
Therefore it can be argued with confidence that
Hitler's interference in Rommel`s operations was a
significant factor in contributing to the Allied
victories in late 1942, rather than being faced by an
organised counter attack by Rommel around the defensive
position of Mersa Matruh which without doubt would have
been far more effective and obviously to Rommel`s
advantage.
1 Peter Young, Purnells Encyclopedias Of The Second
World War (Volume 3, page 871)
2 F.W Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret page 72
3 Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin - Parallel Lives
(page 854)
4 F.W Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret page 101
5 F.W Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret page 101
6 F.W Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret page 97
Supplies
Diverted and Committed Troops
Intelligence in North
Africa
Weapons In North Africa
Commanders and their tactics
Concluding thoughts on the
North African Campaign
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